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Multilateralism and regionalism  
Trade opportunities for sub-Saharan Africa* 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Sub-Saharan-Africa’s (SSA) integration with world markets is not as low as sometimes 
suggested. The exports to GDP ratio of the region is higher than the world average. SSA 
exports 30 percent of its GDP, whereas Latin America only exports 18 percent of its GDP and 
South Asia 15 percent. The ratio of exports to GDP across the world was 24 percent in 2001. 
Thus, although it does not reach the levels of countries in the East Asia and Pacific region 
(with an average of 42 percent), the degree of dependence of SSA on world markets is 
relatively high. 
 However ---as can be seen from Figure 1--- the increase in the exports to GDP ratio 
in SSA has been slower than in other regions during the period 1970-2001. If one excludes 
Nigeria and South Africa from the SSA aggregate the trend is even flatter.  In any case, there 
has been a serious erosion of Africa’s share in world markets. Exports from SSA represented 
more than 3 percent of world trade in the 1950s, but were only slightly above  1 percent in 
2001. Moreover, if one excludes fuel exports, whose share increased from 3 to 6 percent 
during the period, the decline of Africa’s share in world market is even steeper. Indeed, the 
share of SSA in world trade of non-fuel primary commodities went down from almost 9 
percent in 1970 to less than 3 percent in 2001.1     
 Several explanations can be advanced for the decline of SSA share in world markets 
(e.g., badly managed economic and institutional reforms).  In this paper we focus exclusively 
on the role that multilateral and regional trade agreements may have had. We do so not 
because they may be the main explanation behind the declining trend, but because several 
opportunities are offered today in multilateral and regional trade negotiations to try to 
reverse this trend. The objective of this note is to review the trade opportunities facing SSA 
                                                          
*  We are grateful to Maurice Schiff, Javier Suarez and participants at a seminar in HWWA, Hamburg for very helpful 
comments. 
1  See World Bank (2000). 
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both at the multilateral and the regional level. Section 2 focuses on the opportunities for SSA 
at the multilateral level. Section 3 addresses the regional opportunities. Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
 
Multilateral opportunities 
 
Out of 47 countries in the SSA region only 11 are not WTO members.2 The 36 WTO members 
represent 93 percent of SSA’s GDP and 95 percent of its exports. In any case a quarter of 
WTO members are in SSA and an observer unfamiliar with the history of the GATT/WTO could 
expect an important presence of SSA countries in GATT/WTO decisions. This has not been the 
case so far.  
 Historically the participation of SSA in multilateral trade negotiations consisted mainly 
of benefiting through the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) clause of concessions granted among 
developed countries and passively expecting further unilateral concessions through the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). This is a “negotiating strategy” that SSA shares 
with most developing countries. Part of the reason for this passive behavior was that many 
SSA countries did not have representation in Geneva during previous rounds of multilateral 
trade negotiations due to the high costs of maintaining a delegation in Geneva.3  
 As useful as Article I of GATT and its MFN clause may be for countries with little 
bargaining power, this type of strategy has its limits. GATT and WTO negotiations being purely 
mercantilistic, developed countries search for concession in products in which they have an 
export interest. As a consequence, the most important trade barriers remaining across all 
WTO members are in agriculture and labor-intensive manufacturing (e.g., textiles and 
clothing); products in which SSA has a natural comparative advantage. 
 Thus, an important part of the decline in SSA share in world markets might be 
attributed to a relative deterioration of its market access both in developing and developed 
countries. In general, even though developed countries tend to have a much lower average 
tariff than developing countries (see Figure 2), the presence of tariff peaks is much more 
noticeable and mainly affect products exported by SSA countries. Indeed, rest-of-the-world 
exports to the QUAD face tariff peaks (tariffs above 15 percent) in only 4 percent of their 
exports to the QUAD.4 SSA (potentially) faces tariffs above 15 percent in more than 30 
percent of its total exports.5  Tariffs above 100 percent on agriculture products are not 
                                                          
2  The eleven countries are:  Cape Verde,  Comoros,  Equatorial Guinea,  Eritrea,  Ethiopia,  Gambia, Liberia, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia and Sudan. 
3  The  case  of  Mauritania is a good example.  Mauritania  did  not have a  delegation in  Geneva until after the 
Uruguay Round.  Its concessions were decided by a delegation sent to Marrakech to sign the WTO agreement 
with the assistance of the Technical Cooperation Division of the GATT.  
4  The QUAD is composed of Canada, the European Union, Japan and the United States. 
5  See Hoekman et al. (2002). 
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uncommon in the QUAD. Indeed, imports of butter face an MFN tariff of 340 percent in 
Canada. Some types of beef face tariffs above 250 percent in Europe. Sugar imports in Japan 
face tariffs of 170 percent and rice can only be imported through government authorization. 
Groundnuts exports to the United States face tariffs around 350 percent. 
 Many developing countries also have excessive tariffs on imports of agriculture and 
labor-intensive manufacturing. Indeed tariffs above 200 percent are present in the tariff 
schedules of Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Egypt, India, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, 
Ukraine and Zimbabwe. Tariffs at such high levels are obviously quasi-prohibitive and do not 
only affect exports from other countries, but have a high cost in terms of resource allocation 
in countries imposing those tariffs. Moreover many developing countries have other tariffs 
and taxes levied at the border that can reach very high levels (Tanzania for example imposes 
“suspended tariffs” of up to 55 percent on top of the statutory tariffs). These other taxes are 
generally bound under GATT, but at levels usually above 200 percent. These “hidden” tariffs 
could be an important barrier for intra-developing country trade, as they are usually levied on 
products for which there is potential for South-South trade. 
 However, the presence of tariff peaks is much more noticeable in developed 
countries. Figure 3 shows the ratio of the maximum tariff to the average tariff in different 
regions of the world. The highest ratio is to be found among QUAD countries with an average 
ratio of 55. This suggest that on average among QUAD countries, the highest tariff is 55 
times larger than the average tariff in the QUAD. The lowest ratio is found in Sub-Saharan 
Africa with a ratio of around 5 (a maximum tariff 5 times higher than the average tariff).6 
 Moreover, many of these tariff peaks in QUAD countries are specific tariffs, expressed 
in dollars per unit, which suffer from lack of transparency. The incidence depends heavily on 
the export price. And developing countries which generally export products in the lower end 
of the quality spectrum will be taxed relatively more heavily than other countries that export 
high quality products at high prices.  
 The GSP preferences granted by developed countries after the introduction of Part IV 
of GATT in 1965 could in principle allow developing countries to waive these high MFN tariffs 
through preferential access to developed countries market. In practice very little access has 
been obtained through the unilateral preferential concessions granted under the GSP. First, 
trade under GSP schemes remains very small and has been declining through the 1990s.7 
Second, and helping explain the first observation, preferences are generally granted in 
products with already relatively low MFN tariffs. In 1999, the preference margin granted to 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) under the GSP, for products with MFN tariffs above 15 
percent, was 25 percent in Canada, 31 percent in Japan and the United States and 69 
percent in the European Union, whereas for products facing MFN tariffs below 15 percent the 
average preference margin is above 50 percent in all QUAD countries.  
                                                          
6  Average tariffs  (i.e., the denominator of the ratio)  are higher in SSA than in QUAD members  (16 percent 
versus 5 percent), but this only explains a small part of the difference in the ratios of maximum to average tariff 
in the QUAD and in SSA. 
7  See Grether and Olarreaga (1999). 
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 Recognizing these deficiencies of GSP schemes in providing better access to 
developing countries, all QUAD members and other OECD countries have recently deepened 
their GSP schemes, especially with respect to Least Developed and African countries. The two 
most recent publicized schemes are the European Everything But Arms Initiative and the 
United States’ Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The former grants duty free and 
quota free access to the European market for all products (except arms, bananas, rice and  
sugar for which duty free access has been delayed –or excluded in the case of arms) 
exported from Least Developed Countries (37 out of the 49 Least Developed Countries 
according to the UN classification are in Sub-Saharan Africa). The latter has extended US GSP 
preferences to African countries by an additional 1837 tariff lines. It is probably too early to 
judge the success of any of these initiatives with certainty but there has been very little 
improved access through these initiatives. In the case of AGOA most of SSA exports that fall 
under the AGOA regime are oil-related products –more than 90 percent-- benefiting mainly 
oil exporters (Nigeria and Gabon). In the case of apparel products for which special 
provisions are granted that soften rules of origin, only six SSA countries have significant 
exports of apparel (above $1million) in 2001. These are Mauritius, South Africa, Lesotho, 
Kenya, Malawi and Swaziland. In the case of EBA the main users of the preferences are 
Bangladesh and Cambodia; countries outside SSA.  
 Complex rules of origin with high administrative costs are probably also to blame for 
the poor results. The limited institutional and customs capacity of countries in SSA is a major 
barrier to any initiative that is based on preferential access to developed countries’ markets 
and that involves fulfilling rules of origin requirements.8 
 Thus, unilateral preferential schemes provided under GSP can only be a partial 
solution to the market access problems faced by SSA. Simpler steps could be taken at the 
multilateral level that could provide important market access gains for SSA.  
 In the months preceding the WTO Ministerial meeting in Doha that launched a new 
round of multilateral trade negotiations in November 2001, several calls were made for this 
new round to be a “Development Round”. Indeed, after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, 
several governments, firms, and non-governmental organizations in developing countries 
underlined the asymmetry in the benefits associated with the Uruguay Round and received by 
developing and developed countries. The objective of the new Round should, in principle, be 
to shift the balance in the multilateral trading system towards developing countries. If one 
judges by the number of times the words “development” and “technical assistance” are 
mentioned in the Doha declaration, the negotiations are heading towards that objective: 
those two words appear more than 60 times in the 10 pages of the Doha declaration. 
 Two simple propositions can be derived from the discussion above. It is important, 
given the lack of the negotiating and implementation capacity of most developing countries 
and especially those in SSA , for any proposition to be easy to implement. The first 
                                                          
8  See Brenton and Manchin (2002). 
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proposition relates to the existence of specific tariffs in OECD tariff schedules and other taxes 
in developing countries customs. The former should be transformed into ad-valorem 
equivalents and the use of specific tariffs should be banned. The latter should be included in 
the tariff schedules and be within the tariff bindings. The cost of implementing such a reform 
are almost nil and it will add a lot of transparency to the system. 
 The second proposition is to reduce excessive levels of tariffs across all countries. 
Hoekman and Olarreaga (2002) suggest the introduction of a “super MFN rule”. This would 
require WTO members to have all tariffs in their nationals schedules within 5 times the 
average tariff in their country. This would bring the maximum tariff that could be applied in 
the OECD to 25 percent. And in developing countries the maximum tariff would be 85 
percent. In a sample of 113 WTO members for which we disposed of tariff information, 70 are 
above the 5 times rule. The application of such a rule could have a significant effect on 
exports of developing countries as many of the tariff peaks occurred in products in which 
developing countries have a comparative advantage. Such a rule would reduce the existing 
asymmetries in the international trading system in terms of benefits obtained by developing 
and developed countries. If the maximum tariff has to be within a short distance of the 
average tariff, SSA with very little bargaining capacity to reduce tariffs in products in which 
they have a comparative advantage could nevertheless see these tariffs reduced in OECD 
(and developing-country) markets as a consequence of tariff reductions in other tariffs that 
would bring the average down; and by the “rule of 5” the tariff on products of interest for 
SSA exporters would also decline. 
 
 
 
Regional opportunities 
 
In the African context, economic integration remains a key strategy for overcoming the problem of 
a highly fragmented continent with 48 relatively small high-cost economies, and promoting 
economic diversification and inter-linkages among production units in various countries.  
 Acknowledging this Africa has set-up more than 200 regional cooperation schemes in 
the last 30 years, most of them trade-related. However, regional integration, with its complex 
and numerous agreements and institutional arrangements, and political declarations and 
rhetoric has produced very limited concrete results.  Intra-African trade remains very low (see 
table). In 2001, 90 percent of SADC exports, 95 percent of COMESA exports and 85 percent 
of UEMOA exports went to countries outside the region.9 There are at least three potential 
explanations behind the lack of regional trade integration in spite of proliferating agreements. 
First of all, there is a huge gap between formal agreements and actual implementation:  The 
                                                          
 
9  Some may argue that these low numbers are consistent with the small size of SSA or the fact that they have a 
comparative advantage in similar products. 
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record of implementation, by various countries, of treaties, protocols and agreed decisions is 
far from satisfactory. Even today governments continue committing themselves to unrealistic 
and unfeasible dates for regional agreements  (i.e. EAC Customs Union by 2003, ECOWAS 
Customs Union by 2003) that blow up expectations and damage the credibility of the overall 
trade integration process. Much of the failure to implement the agreements has to do with 
concerns about losing much needed customs revenue. To top it off, most regional 
organizations in charge of enforcing the ambitious mandates entrusted to them in their 
treaties and protocols lack the resources to do so. 
 A second problem lies in the existence of multiple, overlapping and often conflicting 
regional integration arrangements within the same region which continues to be a problem 
making implementation very difficult and imposing a heavy burden on limited administrative 
resources in the member countries. Rationalization and harmonization of agreements is 
therefore essential if merging is not possible for political reasons. 
 Finally, although important progress has been made in removing tariff barriers 
through the regional trade agreements, much less attention has been devoted to the 
numerous non-tariff and non-border measures that most countries impose on one another 
preventing any substantial increase of intra-regional trade flows.  
 
Let us illustrate all of this with some examples: 
• In Southern Africa only Mozambique is a member of only one regional trade 
agreement (SADC), but has 8 bilateral trade and investment agreements, making it 
very difficult to implement. In general the job of an SSA customs official could be a 
nightmare if he had to implement all existing agreements (see Figure 4 which 
illustrates the web of regional agreements in Eastern and Southern Africa).10 The 
solution for the customs official is the non-implementation of these agreements 
making them irrelevant. 
• In UEMOA (Union É conomique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine), there has been 
almost perfect convergence to the CET (Common External Tariff), but there is no 
internal free trade. The average tariff collected in Senegal on imports from the rest-
of-the world is 13 percent. The average tariff collected on imports from UEMOA 
partners is 9 percent. Internal free-trade has still a long way to go. Part of the 
reason is the arbitrary rules of origin system of UEMOA. 
• Ethiopia is chairing COMESA since earlier this year. Ethiopia only grants a 10 
percent preference to its COMESA partners. In spite of this Ethiopia is chairing 
discussions regarding regional cooperation in the areas of competition policy and 
investment policy. 
• Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are members of EAC which is supposed to become a 
customs union by November 2003. They are also members of COMESA which is 
                                                          
10  For a similar figure for regional agreements in West Africa see Schiff and Winters (2003),  chapter 3, figure 3.1. 
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supposed to become a customs union by 2004. There is very little –if any--  
coordination between the two regional blocs and it is not clear how Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda will be able to implement different “common” external tariffs. 
• Namibia and Swaziland are SACU members and therefore implement SACU’s CET. 
They are also members of COMESA, so by 2004 they would also have to implement 
two different CETs. 
 
New momentum has been given recently to the regional integration agenda, particularly 
through the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) since two of the eight NEPAD 
priorities have regional dimensions: (i) regional infrastructure and (ii) intra-African trade. 
Among the top priorities for the short run, there is an important need for rationalization of 
regional trade agreements in SSA if countries in the region are to reap the benefits from 
these agreements. The negotiation of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
stemming from the Cotonou Agreement with the European Union that are supposed to be 
concluded by 2007 offers a window of opportunity to do so. The decision of the EU to 
negotiate with groups of countries based on their regional integration processes forces 
African countries to face some of the issues related to these overlapping and conflicting 
agreements. A possible path could be the following. First, each African country should 
preferably be a member of only one customs union –or plan to be a member of only one 
customs union. Also customs unions and FTAs should be made compatible, so that all 
members of the same customs union are also members of the same FTAs. This is particularly 
important for Eastern and Southern Africa, where there is one current customs union and 
other two are currently under negotiation with over-lapping FTAs.  
 Second, the focus of the negotiation for African countries should not be on market access 
into the EU market; on paper most African countries already enjoy quite a good access 
through the EBA initiative. It should rather be on transforming these access already obtained 
“on paper” into reality by obtaining financial and technical assistance that will allow them to 
take advantage of the preferences that have already been granted on paper through the EBA 
initiative to most countries. Efforts should be put on simplifying existing rules of origin and 
customs requirements and granting the capacity to customs and tax administrations in Africa 
to implement those rules.  
 Third, the EU should give equal treatment to all African countries regardless of their 
development status. Fostering and strengthening regional integration is hardly compatible 
with the concept of differentiation for the poorest, as in the case of EBA which provides better 
access to EU markets for LDCs mostly at the expense of other non-EBA African countries. 
Thus, the most generous treatment, like EBA or any other concessions offered by the EU 
should be extended across the continent.   
 Finally, careful consideration should be given also to what concessions Europe 
should seek from African countries under the EPAs. If preferential tariff concessions are 
granted, then long transition periods for African countries’ tariff phase out should be 
considered to avoid large reductions in customs revenue, which are an important source of 
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government financing in SSA. In order to prevent part of these tariff revenue loss and the 
associated welfare losses, Europe may want to negotiate MFN tariff reductions by SSA rather 
than preferential tariff reductions. A proposition along these lines has been suggested by 
Messerlin (2001). An elimination of other taxes and duties at the MFN level by SSA could also 
be the objective of European negotiators.  
 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The decline in SSA participation in world markets can be partly attributed to the relative 
deterioration of its market access both at the multilateral and regional level. This note 
suggests some small steps that could be taken in order to reverse this trend. 
 At the multilateral level, the focus should be on simple rules being introduced in the 
WTO that could enhance the relative bargaining capacity of SSA countries. Two main 
suggestions are made. First, specific tariffs in OECD countries schedules should be 
transformed into ad-valorem equivalents and other taxes and duties levied at customs of 
many developing countries should be included in their tariff schedules and be subject to tariff 
bindings (and not other taxes and duties bindings). These two simple changes would add 
much needed transparency to international taxation. The second suggestion is the 
introduction in the GATT of a “super MFN rule”, which would require all WTO members not to 
impose a tariff that is more than 5 times the average tariff of that country. This would allow 
SSA countries to see tariff reductions in products in which they have a natural comparative 
advantage without any major negotiating effort. 
 At the regional level, the new momentum given to regional integration by NEPAD 
should help overcome some of the political constraints and push forward the regional trade 
agenda. In the short run, the focus should aim at addressing the problems posed by the 
existence of multiple, overlapping and conflicting trade agreements, especially in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. By forcing African countries to negotiate in groups, taking into account their 
regional integration processes, the EPA negotiations with the EU offer a window of 
opportunity to rationalize and simplify the RTAs. African countries should not miss it.  
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Figure 1: Exports to GDP ratio (1970-2001)
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 Source: World Development Indicators, The World Bank. 
 
 
  Source: Hoekman et al (2002). 
 
Figure 2: WTO members average MFN tariffs
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Figure 3: Excessive tariff protection across W T O  
m em bers
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Su
b-S
ah
ara
n A
fric
a
La
tin
 Am
eri
ca
So
uth
 As
ia
De
ve
lop
ing
 co
un
trie
s
Tra
ns
itio
n E
uro
pe
Ea
st 
As
ia
Mi
dd
le 
Ea
st 
& N
ort
h A
fric
a
De
ve
lop
ed
 co
un
trie
s
QU
AD
R
at
io
 o
f M
ax
im
um
 M
FN
 ta
rif
f v
s a
ve
ra
ge
 M
FN
 
 
Source: Hoekman et al (2002). 
 
 
  Table: Intra-regional Trade  in Selected sub-Saharan African Regional Trade Arrangements            
in 1999 
 
Regional Trade 
Arrangements 
Imports  
(Percent of total imports) 
Exports  
(Percent of total exports) 
SADC 11.7 8.3 
COMESA 3.7 7.6 
EAC 18.6 6.9 
RIFF (CBI) 8.4 11.5 
UEMOA 3.6 8.9 
CEMAC NA 2.0 
ECOWAS 13.1 8.4 
   Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
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